Media Guide: Iran’s Proxy Strategy and the Crisis in the Middle East
/By AIC Senior Research Fellow Andrew Lumsden
The Middle East today is in the midst of a resurgence of violent conflict, with lives being lost at a scale unseen in decades. Worse still, there is little end in sight while further escalation remains a dangerously realistic prospect. All of this represents a tragic departure from the relative calm and promising developments the region has experienced in recent years.
The current crisis began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas, a Gaza-based Palestinian militant group, launched an attack on Israel, killing an estimated 1,200 Israelis and foreign residents, and taking more than 200 hostages. In response, Israel launched a military campaign in the Gaza Strip against Hamas. At the time of this publication, the number of deaths in Gaza is estimated to exceed 33,000 with over 76,000 wounded. According to Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry, about two-thirds of these were women and children.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described the war as one between “the entire civilized world” and an “axis of evil, led by Iran.” Though not a direct party, Iran has deep ties to many of the militant organizations central to the current crisis. Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and Khataib Hezbollah in Iraq have all been denounced by Western and Israeli officials as “proxies” of Iran. Scholars and analysts however have questioned the extent to which some of these groups are subservient to Tehran and whether they are acting at its direction.
This Media Guide will explore the four militant organizations most relevant to the current Middle East crisis, their motives and operations, their relationship with Iran and its foreign policy, and how Israel and the United States are responding to them.
The Current Situation in the Middle East
While never fully at peace, the Middle East in the roughly five years before the current war in Gaza had appeared to be on a path towards a historic degree of stability and reconciliation.
In 2019, U.S.-backed coalition forces achieved victory over the Islamic State (ISIS) after a roughly five-year struggle, liberating the last territory held by the brutal terrorist group that once ruled large swathes of Iraq and Syria. The following year, with mediation by the United States; Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Sudan agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, a pariah amongst most Arab and Islamic countries since its founding in 1948.
Beginning in 2022, the United Nations successfully brokered a temporary ceasefire and opened negotiations to end the decade-long civil war in Yemen between Iran-backed Houthi rebels and Yemen's internationally recognized government, backed militarily by a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states.
In 2023, with Chinese mediation, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore and normalize diplomatic relations. The two regional powers have been engaged in a cold war since 1979, one which has helped fuel violent conflicts throughout the region. Also that year, U.S.-mediated talks were underway on possible normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Progress towards Middle East stability would grind to a halt on October 7, 2023. According to Hamas, its attack on Israel, called Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, was a response specifically to the “practices of the extremist and right-wing Israeli government,” which it accuses of planning the “Judaization” of Islamic holy sites such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and attempting to annex the West Bank. Additionally, Hamas cites the “failure of the international community” to prevent other Israeli abuses such as the blockade of the Gaza Strip and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
It is estimated that of the roughly 1,200 Israeli casualties, 70% were civilians. In response, Israel declared war on Hamas and has launched air and ground attacks on Gaza in order to “wipe out” the group. In addition to the massive loss of life in Gaza, the conflict has already led to an increase in violence across the region.
Small clashes have taken place on the Israel-Lebanon border between Israeli forces and Lebanon-based militants. In Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, U.S. military bases have come under attack by Iranian-backed militants. In Yemen, Houthi militants have joined the war, firing rockets at Israel and at cargo vessels passing through the Red Sea, prompting retaliatory airstrikes by the United States and the United Kingdom.
The current conflict has also seen a dramatic escalation in tensions between Israel and Iran. On April 1, 2023, an airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, believed to have been carried out by Israel, resulted in the deaths of two Iranian generals and five officers. In response, Iran carried out its first direct attack on Israel, launching over 300 drones and missiles. Nearly all, however, were intercepted. Israel retaliated on April 19, launching an airstrike near the Iranian city of Isfahan.
How Did Iran React to 10/7?
Iran’s top officials have universally celebrated Hamas’ attack on Israel.
On October 10th, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the operation as an “irrevocable defeat,” for Israel, a “devastating earthquake” which has “managed to destroy some of the main structures of the occupying regime’s rule.” Khamenei moreover charged the Israelis with having “brought this disaster on themselves through their actions,” referring to the “cruelty and crime” of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip, and warned that retaliatory Israeli strikes on Gaza “will only bring a greater disaster upon them.”
President Ebrahim Raisi likewise praised the attack as a “big and bitter military, security and intelligence defeat for the Zionist regime,” and an act of “legitimate defense” by Palestinian people against the “atrocities of the Zionist regime.” Raisi also remarked approvingly that war in Gaza may upend the normalization of relations between Arab/Islamic countries and Israel, saying “the process of normalization of relations was completely overturned. Today, no country in the world dares to say that our relationship with the Zionist regime is established or normal because of the fear of its own people, the atmosphere has become so anti-Zionist.”
Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s Foreign Minister, met with Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political leader in Qatar a week after the attacks on Israel. Echoing his leaders, he called October 7th a “natural reaction” by Palestinian people against Israeli occupation, criticized the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel, and pledged that Tehran would “never back down” from supporting Palestine.
Mohammad Qalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament also hailed the October 7th attacks as “a turning point” which has “changed history,” and exposed the Israeli military as a “cartoon army.”
Iran’s top military officials also weighed in. Maj. Gen. Abdolrahim Mousavi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army praised the 10/7 attacks as a “complex and unprecedented” operation that has done “irreparable” damage to Israel.
Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), praised Hamas for having “inflicted a major defeat” on Israel, adding that the Jewish state “cannot recover from such humiliation” and that the “fake identity of the Zionist regime has fallen apart and nothing else is left of it but a hollow shell.”
Did Iran Orchestrate The 10/7 Attacks?
Despite its effusive praise, Iran has asserted that it had no role in the planning or execution of the attacks on Israel. President Raisi said that “resistance groups do not take orders from us, they have their own analysis, diagnosis, decision and act on their decision.” That said, in December 2023, an IRGC spokesman suggested that Tehran may have been behind the attack, saying that 10/7 was “one of the acts of revenge for the assassination of [former IRGC commander] General Soleimani by the U.S. and the Zionists.”
Hamas then released a statement saying that it “denies the validity of what was stated by the spokesman for the [IRGC]...regarding the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and its motives.” The IRGC’s head, Maj. Gen. Salami also responded, insisting that “Al-Aqsa Flood is independent of our efforts to avenge [Soleimani’s] blood.” Officials in Israel and the United States, including the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have agreed that, regarding 10/7, they so far have no evidence to the contrary. However, some political leaders in both countries have asserted that Tehran is responsible, directly or indirectly, for the attacks.
In an interview with Indian media, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, while acknowledging the lack of hard evidence, suggested that Iran may have helped plan 10/7 citing a meeting between IRGC officials and Iran-backed militant groups in Lebanon in the weeks before the attacks. Herzog posited that Tehran may be “orchestrating” the current Middle East crisis as a means of not only disrupting efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Arab countries but also sabotaging the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a planned trade network that would link Israel with India via Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
In the U.S., a bipartisan group of nine senators issued statements asserting that whether or not Iran was directly behind 10/7, it bears ultimate liability. Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-NV) calls Iran “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism,” arguing that it was “instrumental” to Hamas’ attacks and that Tehran’s “actions are destabilizing the Middle East.” Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK) said that “there’s no disputing the malign influence of Iran in the Middle East, nor the role the regime has played in recent attacks on Israel…there is no Hamas without Iran. There is no Hezbollah without Iran. There are no Houthis without Iran.”
Responding to such allegations, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian called them “totally baseless.” In addition to issuing his own denials, Maj. Gen. Mousavi, head of Iran’s army, alleged that officials in the U.S. and Israel are only “trying to attribute the successful [October 7th attacks]” out of humiliation over the “slap they have received from Hamas.”
Though the extent to which Iran was involved in the October 7th attacks may currently be unknown, Iran has unquestionably provided considerable financial and material backing to Hamas and other militant groups throughout the Middle East, a strategy that has been at the core of its foreign and national security policy for decades.
Iran’s ‘Proxy’ Strategy
In 1979, a popular revolution in Iran overthrew the country’s pro-Western monarchy and brought to power the current theocratic republican regime. Since then, Tehran’s national security strategy has centered around three key political objectives:
Preserving theocratic rule
Defending Iran against internal and external threats
Becoming the Middle East’s dominant power and degrading U.S. influence
In a strategy called “simple yet brilliant” by a former Israeli Prime Minister, Iran has relied largely on non-state actors to accomplish these aims, as the capabilities of its conventional armed forces lag considerably behind those of opponents such as the United States and Israel.
Through the IRGC’s Quds Force, a unit responsible for conducting operations outside of Iran, Tehran has provided training, funds, and weaponry to militant groups throughout the Middle East and beyond, from Lebanon and the Palestinian territories to Afghanistan. Such groups are often referred to in the West as Iranian “proxies.” Iran calls them part of its “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States. These groups have aims which, in whole or in part, align with Tehran’s. Whether to attack Israel, undermine U.S. influence in their countries, or supplant existing regimes.
Allying with these organizations has allowed Iran to successfully undermine its adversaries by enabling devastating attacks on their military personnel and destabilizing regional governments supportive of them, all while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding direct conflict with more powerful enemies.
It should be noted that though somewhat ubiquitous in discussions of Iran’s foreign activities, some analysts have raised questions about the term “proxy,” given that it suggests that the organizations referenced are under Iran’s control and are acting on its behalf.
Diane Zorri, Houman Sadri, and David Ellis, analysts at the U.S. military’s Joint Special Operations University, write that “the “proxy-ness” of an actor is in many ways a subjective assessment about which reasonable people can disagree.” Many of these groups have their own complex origins, goals, and interests which may not always fully intersect with Iranian designs. Moreover, the degree of Iranian influence not only varies among groups, in some cases, its power over a single group has ebbed and flowed as regional circumstances have changed. Hamas is one example.
What is Hamas?
Hamas was formed in 1987, during the First Intifada, a large-scale Palestinian uprising against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The name “Hamas” is an acronym of the group’s formal Arabic-language name Harakat al Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement. It emerged as a Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization based in Egypt. Hamas appealed to religiously conservative Palestinians who supported armed resistance against Israel’s occupation of their lands. Hamas was a contrast to the Islamist but less militant Brotherhood, as well as to the militant but secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yassar Arafat.
Hamas’ beliefs and goals are outlined in its founding charter. It sees Palestine as a waqf, or permanent charitable donation, “upon all Muslim generations” until the end of time. The State of Israel is therefore condemned as an illegitimate “Zionist entity,” and its existence is likened to medieval-era invasions of the region by Christian crusaders and the Mongol Empire. Hamas advocates for violent resistance against Israel, calling for “all dedicated efforts” on the part of Muslims around the world in its “battle with the Jews.” Moreover, the group has condemned any diplomatic settlement with Israel, saying that “there is no solution to the Palestine Problem except jihad” and that diplomatic efforts are a “waste of time,” “child’s play” and “treason.”
The group released a slightly moderated charter in 2017, expressing some openness to a two-state solution and claiming to reject antisemitism.
Hamas began militant activities against Israel in 1989 and established a dedicated military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in 1992. Hamas militants carried out kidnappings and assassinations of both military and civilian Israeli targets, and in 1993 began launching suicide bombings. The United States declared Hamas a terrorist organization in 1997.
Though initially cordial, relations between Hamas and the PLO deteriorated following the 1993 Oslo Accords, in which Arafat and the PLO agreed to end the armed struggle against Israel and recognize the Jewish state in exchange for the establishment of an autonomous government in the Palestinian territories, called the Palestinian Authority.
Violence would break out in 2006 after Palestine-wide legislative elections. Hamas defeated Fatah, the leading PLO faction and the ruling party of the Palestinian Authority. Fatah’s refusal to consent to a Hamas-led government sparked an armed conflict which resulted in Hamas forces taking control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah retaining the West Bank. In response, Israel imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip, and international aid was restricted. Hamas remains in control of Gaza. However following the Oct. 7th attacks, Israel has vowed to permanently end Hamas rule in the Strip and re-assume security control.
What is Hamas’ Relationship With Iran?
Iran is known to have had a relationship with Hamas as far back as the early 1990s. It, like Hamas, also fell out with the PLO over Arafat’s negotiations with Israel and shifted its support to more militant organizations. Ayatollah Khamenei met Hamas’ founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in 1998. The Iranian leader hailed Hamas as the “real representatives of the Palestinian Muslim nation,” and pledged that Iran would support them “to the best of our ability.”
During the 1990s, Tehran began providing training for Hamas fighters and reportedly some US$30 million a year in financial aid. These ties deepened after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. In 2006, Iran reportedly pledged US$250 million to Hamas. In 2008, it began an annual aid flow of US$150 million. Tehran also began providing weapons, including rockets, mortars, shells, gunpowder, and other armaments to the group, as well as training Hamas operatives in local manufacturing of their own weaponry. In 2021, a senior IRGC commander boasted that “instead of giving them a fish…we taught our allies and friends how to make a hook and they are now in possession of missile capabilities and technologies.”
Today, Hamas has a force estimated at between seven and fifty thousand fighters armed primarily with Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. It also fields homemade rockets and drones based on Iranian designs, although the group’s leader has acknowledged that its long-range rockets come directly from Iran, Syria, and “other sources.”
Political leaders in Israel and the West commonly refer to Hamas as a proxy of Iran. However, this terminology may not accurately reflect the nature of the relationship. Beyond hostility towards Israel, Hamas and Iran have little in common. They are adherents to opposing branches of Islam and have at times differed on issues unrelated to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Most notably, a rift emerged between them in 2012 over the civil war in Syria. Hamas refused to back President Bashar al-Assad, a Shi’a and ally of Iran, over the predominantly Sunni opposition forces. Hamas even relocated its political offices from Damasus to Qatar, with a Hamas official even accusing Assad’s Syria of having “oppressed its people.” In 2012, Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh publicly expressed support for the Syrian opposition calling them “heroic people…striving for freedom, democracy, and reform.” In response, Iran reduced its financial aid to Hamas by roughly 50%. However, beginning in 2014, the two sides reconciled.
Hamas’ relationship with Iran is summarized well by the American Enterprise Institute which writes, “Iran did not create Hamas and does not control it. But Tehran has clearly seized opportunities to establish a patron-client relationship...”
Hezbollah
The outbreak of the current Israel-Hamas War almost immediately prompted fears among observers about what the response would be from Hezbollah, another Iranian-backed group based in Lebanon with a history of violent conflict with Israel.
On October 9th, the U.S. Department of Defense said that it was “deeply concerned about Hezbollah…choosing to open a second front to this conflict.” Four days later, during a meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister in Beirut, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General hinted that they might be open to doing just that, saying, “we are fully prepared — when the time comes — for any action that we will carry out.”
In response to the threat from Hezbollah, Israel evacuated some 80,000 civilians from communities near its Lebanese border and moved a heavy military presence into the region. However, barring some small-scale exchanges, no major fighting has broken out so far.
Compared to Hamas, Hezbollah is an older and more experienced militant group, possessing far greater offensive capabilities. Hezbollah, meaning ‘Party of God’ was founded in 1982 by Lebanese Shi’a clerics amidst the country’s brutal sectarian civil war. This was particularly in response to the entrance of Israel into the conflict, as well as the arrival of a U.S.-led international force to Beirut that year.
In 1983, Hezbollah launched suicide attacks on U.S. and French forces in Beirut, which killed 299 and led to the withdrawal of U.S. and European troops the following year. Hezbollah's attacks on Israeli forces, which occupied Southern Lebanon in support of an allied Christian militia, led to Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah continued attacks on Israel which resulted in a brief war between the two in 2006. The war was considered a relative success for Hezbollah as it avoided destruction.
Designated a terrorist organization by more than 60 countries, Hezbollah today remains a formidable military force. Its leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed in 2021 to have 100,000 fighters. Experts however put that figure lower, to about 40,000 to 50,000. Additionally, the group is estimated to have between 150,000 to 200,000 rockets and missiles, including anti-tank, anti-ship, and anti-air missiles.
Hezbollah also wields power in Lebanon as a political party. It holds 13 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member Parliament. Although Hezbollah’s bloc lost the majority in 2022, it controls enough votes to stall the election of a President, which it has done since October 2022, demanding that its preferred candidate be selected.
What Is Hezbollah’s Relationship With Iran?
Compared with Hamas, Hezbollah’s characterization as an Iranian proxy is far more appropriate. Its founding charter includes a declaration of allegiance to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first Supreme Leader. Khomeini is referred to as the group’s “one leader,” and “one tutor.”
In a 2019 interview, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah said that Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s current Supreme Leader, has been involved with them from “the very early hours of the establishment and foundation of this group.” Initially serving as his predecessor’s representative to the group, he remained a key figure in Hezbollah since ascending to the leadership. According to Nasrallah, Khamenei was in constant contact, provided guidance to Hezbollah leaders including on matters of domestic Lebanese politics, and received progress reports from the group.
Nasrallah says that Hezbollah has “pledged allegiance” to Ayatollah Khamenei, whom he refers to as the leader of “all Muslims.” He also credits the IRGC with providing training and arming Hezbollah members.
Hezbollah receives an estimated US$700 million a year in financial aid from Iran, along with money and arms. It has also been instrumental in helping Iran defend its ally, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad during the decade-long Syrian Civil War. As of 2019, it is estimated that Hezbollah has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in Syria. In addition to fighting, Hezbollah has also helped Iran train and organize other Shia militias in Syria and Iraq.
Some analysts argue that Hezbollah’s value to Iranian interests is the reason the group has so far not committed any significant forces against Israel in the current war. Even in the best of circumstances, a war with Israel would seriously degrade Hezbollah militarily, rendering it unable to continue its contributions to the war in Syria and in need of massive Iranian aid to rebuild. Furthermore, the impact such a conflict would have on Lebanon would likely destroy Hezbollah’s, and therefore Iran’s, popular support and political influence in the country.
The Houthi Movement
One group that has demonstrated no such reluctance to enter conflict with Israel has been the Houthi movement, based in Yemen.
Formally named Ansar Allah, meaning “Defenders of God,” the group is commonly called the Houthi movement or the “Houthis” after its founder Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Springing from a 1990s social movement in northwestern Yemen calling for greater rights for Zaidis, a Shi’a minority in Yemen, the Houthi movement began a militant insurgency in 2004 against Yemen’s government led by pro-Saudi and pro-Western dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Popular protests, inspired by the region-wide Arab Spring, forced Saleh to resign in 2011 in favor of his Vice President. Ironically, Saleh and his loyalists would later ally with the Houthis and help them seize control of Yemen’s capital Sana'a in 2014. In response, Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Sudan, launched a military campaign to remove the Houthis. The Saudi-led intervention has been unsuccessful. The Houthis have retained control of Sana’a and northern Yemen. Today, the group is estimated to have a strength of about 20,000 fighters.
The Houthis praised Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7 saying the operation exposed the “weakness, fragility, and impotence of the temporary Zionist entity.” In the following weeks, missiles from Yemen were fired at Israel, but all were intercepted by U.S. Navy vessels in the Red Sea or Israeli defenses. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the attempted attacks on October 31st, and pledged to continue “qualitative strikes with missiles and drones until the Israeli aggression stops.” The Houthi government’s Prime Minister added that “we cannot allow this arrogant Zionist enemy to kill our people.“
In November 2023, the Houthis announced that ships affiliated with Israel attempting to access the Red Sea would be considered “legitimate targets.” Since then more than thirty cargo vessels have been attacked by the Houthis, including with the use of anti-ship missiles. The Red Sea is crucial to the global economy. 15% of all international trade travels through it, including nearly nine million barrels of oil per day. Despite the Houthis’ stated intentions, ships with no ties to Israel have also been attacked.
Since January 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom have been carrying out airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. So far, however, they have not been successful in deterring the group’s attacks. The group’s leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, said in February 2024 that Houthi anti-shipping operations “are continuing, escalating, and effective,” claiming that they plan to begin employing “submarine weapons” as well.
What is Houthis’ Relationship With Iran?
AIC first discussed the Houthis and their relationship with Iran in 2019. In summary, although political leaders in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States often assert that the Houthis are proxies of Iran, analysts have been more skeptical for four key reasons:
There is no evidence that Iran had any role in the group’s founding, which is attributed exclusively to local grievances.
There is no clear evidence that Iran supplied arms to the Houthis before about 2009, over four years into its insurgency against the Yemeni government.
Iran reportedly opposed the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in 2014 and advised against it. Nevertheless, the offensive took place, suggesting Iran does not enjoy command and control over the group.
Aside from antipathy towards Israel, the United States and Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Houthis have few commonalities. Houthi Zaidism is very different from Iran’s branch of Shi’a Islam, and the Houthis have said they have no intention of creating a Shi’a state in Yemen.
Iran’s approach to the Houthis appears to be similar to that with Hamas, a marriage of convenience, in which Iran seized an opportunity to establish a patron-client relationship with an organization with which it shares common enemies.
Iran has supplied the Houthis, directly or through Hezbollah, with military training and weapons, including missiles, drones, and mines. Though sometimes renamed, these armaments generally resemble those used by Iran itself or Hezbollah. According to U.S. officials, Iran also provides financial aid to the Houthis. Allegedly, funds from the IRGC’s Quds Force are transferred to companies based in Turkey and then to Houthi-affiliated companies in Yemen. The U.S. quantifies the scale of this financing only as “tens of millions of dollars.”
In January 2024, Reuters reported, citing sources in Yemen that Iran has been heavily involved in the Houthis’ recent missile attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping. In addition to training Houthi fighters in the use of missiles, Iranian agents have allegedly been supplying intelligence to Houthi fighters, enabling them to select targets for attack.
The Houthis and Iran have both denied these allegations. A Houthi spokesman said that while the group has “benefited” from Iranian military training and weaponry, and they “don’t deny [having] a relationship with Iran,” Houthi decisions are “independent” and have “nothing to do with any other party."
For their part, Iran’s Foreign Ministry says that “resistance groups in the region do not take orders from the Islamic Republic of Iran…[they] make their own decisions based on their principles, priorities, and interests of their country and people.” The IRGC has said the same, and again accuses the U.S. of blaming Iran for the Houthis’ actions because they “don’t want to admit their failure.”
Kataib Hezbollah
The Houthis have not been the only militant group that, though geographically far removed from the war in Gaza, have cited the conflict as a reason for escalating their own militant activities.
Since 10/7, U.S. military bases in the Middle East, predominantly in Iraq and Syria, have been subjected to more than 150 rocket, missile, and drone attacks. Though these attacks did cause injuries, none were fatal until January 28, 2024, when three U.S. troops stationed in Jordan, near the Iraqi border, were killed in a drone attack on their base. The Pentagon has accused Kataib Hezbollah (KH), one of the more than 100 militia groups active in Iraq, of being the main perpetrator of attacks on U.S. forces, and has said that it suspects KH of the deadly attack in Jordan as well. The U.S. has since conducted several airstrikes against the group’s installations and leadership.
Its name meaning “Battalions/Brigades of the Party of God,” Kataib Hezbollah was founded in 2007 in a merger of five smaller Shi’a Iraqi militant groups that emerged amidst the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. During the war, KH is accused of carrying out “some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. and coalition forces,” primarily using roadside bombs and improvised rocket-assisted mortars. The U.S. designated KH as a terrorist organization in 2009.
When the U.S. withdrew most of its forces from Iraq in 2011, KH shifted its focus to battling Sunni militant groups, including the Islamic State, in Iraq and neighboring Syria. The group took part in several major battles in the fight against ISIS including the siege of Aleppo and the recapture of major Iraqi cities such as Samarra, Fallujah, and Mosul.
Despite being co-belligerents with the United States in the war against ISIS, KH remains vehemently anti-American. In January 2024, a KH spokesman said the group’s goal remains “expelling the U.S. from the [Middle East],” in order to “make it stable” and “ safe from their evil.”
Between 2018 and 2020, it carried out sporadic attacks on U.S. personnel and installations in Iraq. However, it confirmed that it would resume and expand attacks on U.S. forces as a response to the war in Gaza. Three days after the Hamas attack on Israel, KH’s leader Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi said that his group’s “religious obligation forces us to obey God’s orders,” and join the fight against “pagans.”
U.S. intelligence estimates that KH has up to 10,000 fighters and has sophisticated military equipment including armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and air defense systems. Since 2014, KH, along with several other militias have been formally incorporated into the Iraqi security apparatus as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). KH is considered a leading faction in the PMF and its founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was one of the PMF’s most senior commanders and de facto leader. Al-Muhandis was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2020.
On January 30, 2024, KH claimed that it would suspend attacks on U.S. forces.
What is Kataib Hezbollah’s Relationship with Iran?
As with its counterpart in Lebanon, officials and analysts agree that Kataib Hezbollah can appropriately be described as a proxy of Iran.
The IRGC was instrumental to the group’s creation. Its members also have acknowledged Ayatollah Khamenei as their spiritual leader. Analysis by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy found that there is “clear and convincing evidence” that Kataib Hezbollah not only receives financing, arms, training, and intelligence from Iran, but that it carries out operations at the IRGC’s direction, and under its supervision. Furthermore, the “preponderance of evidence” shows that the IRGC even has a hand in selecting the group’s leadership.
Many of KH’s top figures, including founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have close ties with the IRGC. Before creating KH, Al-Muhandis was a member of the Badr Organization, another Iranian proxy group founded in the 1980s, and worked closely with the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah for decades. He also reportedly was a senior advisor to Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, former head of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Soleimani and Al-Muhandis were both killed in the same U.S. airstrike in Baghdad in 2020.
Recent reports suggest that Iran still wields massive influence over Kataib Hezbollah, even in the absence of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis. KH’s January 30th announcement that it is suspending attacks on U.S. bases came 24 hours after a visit to Baghdad by Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani, the Quds Force’s current commander. Moreover, it represents an abrupt and pronounced shift from KH’s stated position of only three weeks earlier, when its spokesman said that their “operations against the U.S.” were “synchronized” with the war in Gaza and “will not stop,” even if that conflict ends.
Citing sources in Iraq and Iran, The New York Times and Reuters report that despite rebuffing requests by the Iraqi government and top Iraqi Shi’a clerics not to continue provoking the United States, KH agreed to suspend attacks only after direct orders from Gen. Qanni.
Again, Iran's official position is that it has no involvement in the “decision-making of resistance groups.”
How Are The U.S. and Israel Responding to Iran’s Strategy?
Generally, the U.S. has responded to attacks by Iranian-backed groups with targeted military strikes and at times, economic sanctions. Israel has launched larger-scale retaliatory military actions such as in Lebanon in 2006 and in the current war in Gaza. However, since 10/7, there has been a push from some segments of the political leadership in Israel and the United States to begin countering Iran’s ‘proxy’ strategy with attacks on the Islamic Republic itself.
In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett writes that although the “evil empire” of Iran has been “at the center of most of the Middle East’s problems and much of global terror” since 1979, through the use of “terrorist proxies” “inexplicably, almost nobody is touching it.” Bennett reveals that as Prime Minister he directed Israeli security forces to avoid clashes with Hezbollah and Hamas as much as possible and instead target Iran. He claims that under his leadership, Israel responded to attempted attacks by Iran-backed groups with strikes on Iranian territory, allegedly resulting in the destruction of a drone base and the assassination of a “terror unit” commander “in the center of Tehran.” He urges Israel and the United States to employ similar strategies with the “clear goal of bringing down Iran’s evil regime.” The recent Israeli strikes on Iran’s Damascus consulate and near Isfahan suggest that Israeli leaders appear to be heeding this advice.
Some in Washington agree with Bennett’s sentiment. In response to the 10/7 attacks, U.S. Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) suggested that the U.S. should attack Iranian oil refineries “to put them out of business” should the conflict escalate any further. Graham, along with nine other senators of both parties, then introduced a resolution that would direct President Joe Biden to “[keep] all options on the table, including the use of military force” to “deter” Iran and its allies from “expanding the ongoing conflict.”
Future Outlook
From pushing U.S. and Israeli forces out of Lebanon, preserving a friendly regime in Syria, gaining a new power base in Yemen and frustrating U.S. aims in Iraq, Iran’s ‘proxy’ strategy has won it many victories. It has, however, also helped to fuel decades of violence and chaos in the Middle East, and in many ways may ultimately undermine rather than protect Iran’s interests.
Even if it did not orchestrate the 10/7 attacks, Iran’s decades of backing militant groups like Hamas have undoubtedly enabled this bout of violence in the Middle East. Violence, which has not only claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Palestinians but has arguably set back the cause of Palestinian self-determination. Since the outbreak of war, Israel has only expanded settlement of the West Bank and it potentially may resume more direct control of Gaza. Moreover, Iran itself now faces what it has so long tried to avoid, direct attacks on its territory and military.
For its part, Israel must remember the lessons of recent history. Decades of military victories have yet to bring it lasting peace and security. Also, as evidenced by events in countries such as Iraq and Libya, the overthrow of unsavory governments in the Middle East generally has not had the desired effects and instead led to more violence and instability.
For the Middle East to move forward, all sides must recognize that conflicts in the region very rarely have any military solutions and must be addressed through dialogue and diplomacy. Unrealistic ambitions, such as the destruction of Israel and regime change in Iran should be abandoned. Normalization and reconciliation between countries should be encouraged instead of sabotaged, the arming and financing of militant groups should end and all sides should use whatever influence they have to promote stability and development in a region that has seen far more than its share of violence.
