According to Iran's Interior Ministry, 1,014 people, including 89 women, have registered to run in next month's presidential election. The deadline for registration was May 14, and during the next 10 days, the Guardian Council will screen the list of candidates and disqualify those they consider inappropriate. Observers say that the Council is likely to remove the names of the women who registered, even though Iran's constitution does not ban them from running, and that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who announced his candidacy, is likely to be a front-runner in the contest.

Things to consider:

Judging from past experience, the Guardian Council is likely to select only a handful of candidates to stand in the Presidential election. Under the guise of "selection", hundreds of legitimate candidates will be disqualified on uncertain grounds. Following the catastrophe of the 2004 Parliamentary elections, the GC should consider the importance of "freeness" and "fairness," by allowing a larger, more representative field, of candidates to stand in the election.

Iran's Upcoming Presidential Election Draws 1,000 Candidates http://www.politinfo.com/articles/ article_2005_05_15_2241.html

Rafsanjani urges U.S. to begin thaw in ties
http://www.metronews.ca/reuters_interna tional.asp?id=73991

Iranians Cool to the Presidential Elections
http://www.iran- press-service.com/ips/articles-2005/may- 2005/iran_elections_17505.shtml

1,010 Bid for Iran's Presidential Nod
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wire Story?id=758132

The European Union and Iran remain in an impasse over Iran's nuclear development program. Iran has now demanded significant incentives such as a deal for 10 nuclear reactors, a top Iranian negotiator said; but Iran still refuses to abandon its plans to enrich nuclear fuel, which is viewed with suspicion by the United States as a cover for developing nuclear weapons. The European Union said any Iranian moves to resume their suspended fuel cycle would prompt it to break off the talks and refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible penalties.

Things to consider:

1) The negotiations ARE NOT negotiations - Iran refuses to abandon nuclear enrichment and has suggested that successful negotiations would allow uranium enrichment and in the event of failed negotiations, they will resume enrichment activities. Unless Europe is willing to negotiate away its remaining leverage on Iran, by offering carrots and receiving none in return, or Iran is willing to abandon enrichment in the foreseeable future, the negotiations have already failed.

2) The nuclear issue SHOULD NOT BE the only concern of Europe and the United States. Dialogue, friendship, and the resolution of outstanding issues between the United States and Iran would go a long way to lessen the threat of nuclear technology and even nuclear weapons. Instead of placing emphasis on the most difficult issue, the United States should consider increasing action on regional stability, a more democratic Iran (via free and fair elections), and issues of human rights.

Iran seeks incentives in nuclear impasse
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory. mpl/world/3188655

Few good options in Iran nuclear debate
http://msn bc.msn.com/id/7874703/

Venue of EU-Iran nuclear talks still undecided
http://www.irna.ir/en/n ews/view/menu-234/0505180733135239.htm

Tehran has made decision on its nuclear rights: Kharrazi
http://www.tehrant imes.com/Description.asp? Da=5/17/2005&Cat=2&Num=005

Iran not to compromise its right for peaceful use of nuclear energy
http://www.irna.ir/en/ne ws/view/line-17/0505181170171210.htm

by Clifford Kupchan

Clifford Kupchan is Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy at The Nixon Center. At an AIC conference held on July 16, 2004 on Iran's Nuclear Program: Fact and Fiction, he spoke on "Iranian Nuclear Potential and its Effect in the Middle East." I think it is incumbent on all of us to think through the implications of a nuclear Iran.

I will begin by commenting generally on what the implications for international security system might be, then how the US and other regional actors might react. I will conclude with my opinion of the opportunity costs of this whole nuclear debate. I think there is a lot that could be achieved in the Middle East right now, especially in the Persian Gulf, that we're losing out on because of this nuclear impasse.

First, however, I think we need to talk about what it means for Iran to have a nuclear program, to have the bomb. And there are three or four different scenarios that Iran could adopt, and the difference, I think, is important in following through the analysis.

The first is an India/Pakistan type scenario, with several dozen deployed warheads on surface-to- surface missiles in dispersed locations.

The second possibility is a smaller force with warhead and missiles separated, public but smaller.

Third is the Israeli model of total public ambiguity, but clearly a nuclear power.

Fourth is a covert force, where deterrence depends on rumor.

And fifth is simply the possession of a fuel cycle, which is not a nuclear power, but as with the Japan status, everyone knows could become one very quickly.

For analytic purposes, I'm going to assume a situation somewhere between model 1 and model 2, a sizable deployed force, because that drives the logic of a nuclear Iran. I think the first major concern is the effect that Iranian breakout would have on the NPT, on the IAEA, on the entire global nonproliferation regime. If Iran and/or North Korea go nuclear, we would have a case of two states that are signatories to the NPT having gone nuclear, and that would certainly have implications for a spiral of proliferation, and could well deal a death blow to the NPT as an institution which has governed that area since 1968.

Second, from an international systemic point of view, it's unbiased fact that in the aftermath of September 11, of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, stability in the Middle East is, perhaps, the most important goal facing the international security community. An Iranian bomb would be immensely destabilizing.

Third is the issue of a nuclear spiral. An Iranian bomb could set off a classic case of what we call in political science a "security dilemma," one country feeling threatened by the other country feeling threatened by the other country.

Fourth, and last, is the issue of what these Iranian or other Middle Eastern forces would look like. They could be very small. Small forces invite preemption, and that's another tenet of nuclear weapons theory. A lot of vulnerable forces is a nuclear nightmare. So there are serious structural issues that I think an Iranian government, an American government, or any government would be concerned about.

Turning to the political and military concerns of the US, which, as you know, is currently the world's only superpower, the US's first concern is most obviously Iran's 25 years of hostility towards the United States. Certainly, both sides are responsible. There have been lots of missed opportunities. There have been failures on both sides. The fact remains that Iranian policy is what it is, which is a hostile policy towards the US and its allies, most prominently including Israel, and the prospect of that hostile conventional diplomacy becoming a hostile nuclear diplomacy is one that doesn't sit well with any American policymaker.

Defence Journal

by Hamid Hussain

'I believe that there has been a reinforcing mutual mistrust and suspicion rooted in history to the point of an obsession'.
Iranian ambassador to UN, Muhammad Javad Zarif, January 14, 2005

Iran and United States were close allies during the reign of Raza Shah Pahalvi. After the 1979 revolution, the relationship changed to active hostility. Since then the relationship between the two has become hostage to mutual distrust. Active military involvement of US in the region especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries bordering Iran brought the Iranian question to the forefront. In this context, the revelations in 2004 about an extensive Iranian nuclear program focused US attention on Iran in a different context. Initial US response was bellicose statements but no concrete policy initiative. The main reason was the full and undivided attention of Washington in Iraq due to escalating cycle of violence and instability. When three European countries (Britain, France and Germany called EU-3) decided to engage Tehran on its nuclear issue, US stayed on the sidelines. The new US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called EU-3 negotiations with Tehran as a 'toothless enterprise'. However after President Bush's European visit, she stated that US will support EU initiative.

US policy towards Iranian nuclear issue has seen a shift for various reasons. Of several factors, the realization on part of Washington that their diplomatic options are very limited and more importantly their military options are even more limited than diplomatic ones. Iraq factor was crucial in these conclusions where there is growing realization among policy makers, especially military brass that Tehran has unlimited possibilities for influencing events in Iraq. This article will look at the current approaches of US and Iran towards the thorny issue of Tehran's nuclear option. It will also briefly review current negotiations between EU-3 and Tehran with some recommendations.

Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi is a candidate in Iran's presidential elections on June 17. He is President of the American Iranian Council and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. See his official site, Amirahmadi.com.

Arash Salehi: John Kerry, during his election campaign, said that if elected he would offer Iran direct talks. First, given the situation in Iran, could a direct talk take place between Iran and the US? And second, does the "direct talk" option still have supporters in the Bush administration? [Persian text in Emrooz]

Hooshang Amirahmadi: To begin with, let me thank you for the opportunity to discuss US-Iran relations. As you may know, I have spent over 15 years on the subject, continuously warning both sides that the conflict between the two countries could spiral into disaster. I am afraid that in the absence of any serious initiative on both sides, my predictions could come true.

I am pleased to say that I provided important opportunities for Iran to mend relations with the US, but the Iranian government failed to recognize and utilize the opportunities.

One such opportunity occurred during President Clinton's administration in March 2002, at an American Iranian Council conference, when Secretary Madeleine Albright extended a regret and then an apology to the Iranian people for America's wrong policies toward Iran including the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (even if the real makers of that coup were the British).

Unfortunately, opportunities of that nature will not arise again between the two governments. September 11 has changed the American security and political environments drastically, and in the meantime, the Islamic Republic has drifted toward a harder line at home and abroad, or at least that is what is seen from the outside to have happened in Iran.

Senator Kerry offered direct talk, but he had a difficult condition: that Iran halt uranium enrichment completely and return the spent fuel back to Russia. Iran has accepted this last condition in a recent contract with Russia, but it has difficulty making compromises on the enrichment issue with the European Three (UK, France, Germany). So I believe that even if Senator Kerry had become the American President, the direct talk would have not taken place between the two.

Aside from the difficulty for Iran to accept stopping the enrichment altogether, domestic Iranian politics would have made it difficult for Iran to enter into a direct dialogue with the US. A web of networks, some with Mafia-like economic and political interests, opposes US-Iran dialogue. Even if the Iranian domestic politics could have been overcome, the American domestic politics would have eliminated the dialogue option.

The most powerful elements of the Bush administration are no longer interested in negotiating with Iran as long as the political system in Tehran remains unacceptable to them. Never before has the link between Iran's domestic politics and US-Iran relations been as strong as it is today. Separating them is becoming increasingly impossible.