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13th Annual Middle East Petroleum & Gas Conference
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IN THIS ISSUE
The Role of the IAEA
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Eye on Iran's Election: A Presidential Election Update
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Iran's Nuclear Program: Fact and Fiction - Excerpts from speech by Mostafa Zahrani
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Please click on "Read More" or a "Photograph" to be taken to the appropriate story.
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Iran's Presidential Election Update
Engineers inspect nuclear facilities at Bushehr.
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AIC Update is an information resource for US-Iran relations and the efforts of the American Iranian Council to promote dialogue and understanding between the United States and Iran.
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(Pictured Right) The 13th Annual Middle East Petroleum & Gas Conference, to be held in conjunction with Middle East Petroleum & Gas Week (April 2-7, 2005) will feature two speakers connected with the American Iranian Council. Dr. Amirahmadi will be part of a panel on Geopolitics in the Middle East, and Dr. Fereidun Fesharaki, President of FACTS Inc. and a member of AIC’s Board of Directors, will issue a welcome as one of the Co-Chairmen of the conference and will provide commentary on the oil market.
(Pictured Below) Engineers inspect nuclear facility at Brushehr, Iran. The Bushehr plant is being built under an agreement between the Russian and Iranian governments.
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The Role of the IAEA
On Monday, March 23, 2005, the United Nations nuclear watchdog Mohamed ElBaradei called on the United States to make a security pledge for Iran in order to push forward the nuclear negotiations by Europe. Although Washington promptly discredited the offer, one can expect the IAEA to become increasingly important to the Iranian nuclear program and to US-Iran relations in the coming months.
- If Iran moves towards complete transparency in its nuclear activities, the IAEA will be tasked with examining its programs in greater depth. Iran has allowed greater access since it was first discovered that it was covertly carrying out nuclear experiments. The organization has concluded that Iran does not have nuclear weapons and that its current programs are peaceful.
- The current Administration has shown no great interest in international institutions, but current law prevents any unilateral assurances from proceeding under other auspices. As such, the UN and the IAEA are the currently available mechanisms for verification.
- Ultimately, the United States charges Iran with using its civilian nuclear programs as cover for the development of weapons. Since examination has yet to prove this, the United States is betting on “intent.” To this point, there is no foolproof mechanism for examining the seriousness of intentions.
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AIC has published and disseminated several important books, studies, and newsletters. These publications clearly demonstrate an objective, impartial, balanced and diverse approach. Please click on book to browse and purchase AIC publications. |
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Eye on Iran's Election
An agreement between the Ministry of Interior and the Guardian Council has scheduled Iran’s upcoming presidential election for June 17, 2005 to replace reformist President Mohammed Khatami. Current polls suggest that the election is expected to continue into a runoff race, which will take place at least a week later than the first round of elections, most probably on June 24, 2005. Many political analysts have suggested that the election is lining up to be a contest among conservative candidates. Nevertheless, both conservative and reformist camps have confirmed the intentions of a large number of candidates to run in the June elections. Meanwhile, Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservative-leaning pragmatist and former President, remains a wild card by straddling both camps. Although Rafsanjani has not made a firm commitment to run, the registration of Presidential candidates is not expected until May of 2005. At this early stage, the Council has identified and explained some of the key candidates.
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
Current Position: Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, Deputy Chairman of the Assembly of Experts
Experience: President (1989-1997), first Speaker of Parliament
Brief Biography:
Rafsanjani was a key member of Iran's Revolutionary Council at the beginning of the new Islamic Republic and is currently one of Iran’s most influential politicians.
Supported by:
Rafsanjani receives moderate support from both reformists and conservative; Executives of Construction Party (reformist), Islamic Civilization Party, Islamic Labour Party (conservative), Jam'iyat-e Vafaadaaraan-e Enghelaab-e Eslaami (conservative), Moderation and Development Party (conservative), and Workers' House (reformist)
Mehdi Karroubi
Current Position: Member of the Expediency Discernment Council
Experience: Speaker of Parliament (2002 – 2004, 1989- 1992)
Brief Biography:
Karroubi is the chairman and founding member of the Militant Clerics Society party. Karroubi is a critic of the Guardian Council but at the same time supports the Supreme Leader, and calls himself a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Supported by:
Karroubi is considered a reformist, but is considerably pragmatic; Militant Clerics Society (MCS), Islamic Association of Engineers, and Majma'-e Gorooh-haa-ye Khat-te Emam.
Mostafa Moin
Current Position: Advisor to the President of Iran
Experience:
Minister of Culture and Higher Education (1983 – 1993), Minister of Science, Research, and Technology (the same post, with a changed name) (2000 – 2003), Representative of Shiraz in Majlis (elected 1982)
Brief Biography:
Moin is a long-time politician and medical doctor. Moin has repeatedly tried to push improved “scientific productivity” through his Ministerial positions.
Supported by:
Moin is the most reformist-minded candidate and risks the Guardian Council's rejection of his candidacy; Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) and Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO).
Ali Ardashir Larijani
Current Position: not currently serving
Experience:
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (1994 – 2004), Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (under President Rafsanjani)
Brief Biography:
Larijani comes from both a religious and political family. He is the brother of Sadegh Larijani (a cleric member of the Guardian Council), Mohammad Javad Larijani, and Fazel Larijani, (Iran's cultural attachee in Ottawa).
Supported by::
Larijani is supported inside the conservative alliance by the Islamic Society of Engineers (ISE) and the higher officials of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Ali Akbar Velayati
Current Position: Advisor in International Affairs to the Supreme Leader
Experience:
Foreign Minister of Iran (December 15, 1981 – August 20, 1997), was proposed as Prime Minister under Presidency of Ali Khamenei but failed to receive Majlis support
Brief Biography:
Velayati is a long serving politician and pediatrician. He acquired both his MD and pediatrics degrees from the University of Tehran, in 1971 and 1974 respectively.
Supported by:
Velayati is supported inside the conservative alliance by Islamic Coalition Party (ICP).
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Dr. Mostafa Zahrani has been a long-time member of the Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations. He currently represents the Institute for Political and International Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The following excerpts come from a lecture he made on July 16, 2004 at an AIC Conference entitled “Iran’s Nuclear Programs: Fact and Fiction.”
Does Iran want to have a better stance in international politics? Those people who have the bomb, have they gotten a better stance in the international system or not? Does Pakistan have a better stance? Does North Korea have a better stance? No. When it goes to the decisionmaking level, these questions will be fundamental, especially when the cost comes. You can have it, but at what cost? What would you have to put in to get that bomb? So this is the real question.
Now they talk about domestic pressure. That's nonsense. Some people at the scholarly level will say, the people want this. The public wants it. That is not the case, I believe. I have been among them. The people don't want it. Because, as I said, the Iranian economic value expectation is that they don't want their country to be militarized. They don't want their country to be securitized. They want better development. They want better political reform, political freedom. These are the things that they want and they think that to be able to live with their neighbors, when the country is developed, is much better than having the bomb. The bomb will create problems for them instead of giving them immunity. So I believe the domestic pressure is not there, that some people argue would be a cause for Iran.
What about the security concept? Say that prestige is solved and hegemony is solved and domestic pressure is solved, then what about the security issue? Iran is in a watertight region. You have Pakistan, then you have Israel, then you have America, the United States forces now around Iran, then water. We have not had any historical problem with Pakistan. We don't have any border dispute with them. We don't have any ideology problem with them. So, even when Pakistan had nuclear tests, some people said, this is an Islamic bomb that would be in the service of Iranian regime. So that is not really an issue. Saddam Hussein is gone, so we don't have a threat over there. What remains? The US and Israel.
Then, to say we want a nuclear bomb for the US and Israel, you have to justify it. First, is it really a threat or is the threat imminent or not? This is a matter of fundamental debate at the decisionmaking level. Assuming that the threat is imminent, then comes the question, how are you going to fight back? Do you think that you can do it with your WMD? Do you think that you can do it with your nuclear bomb? Here the deterrence comes in. They say, those who argue, that because you have a threat there, you have to deter it. How to deter it with just nuclear bombs?
This is a real question in the Iranian decisionmaking body. How can you have a deterrence capability? You should have the second strike capability. In Iran, the prevailing view among the decisionmakers is that Israel and the US, from the capability point of view, are very far from what we are. Assume that we have a few bombs, with this distance that we're talking about, we will never have the second strike capability. So we will never have the deterrence that you are talking about.
So this is the prevailing argument. You may hear some people saying that with a small number of bombs, you can have a second strike capability. Here in the US and different branches of university and even the defense budget, I think, this view still remains But in Iran, the prevailing view is that with a small number of bombs you cannot get the second strike capability, so you won't be able to deter the enemy. You should find some other way.
So, if Iran doesn't want a bomb, why they keep emphasizing enrichment? Iran is an island, sitting on an ocean of oil; why do they need that?
Here are some points which I try to make. First, look at the population of Iran. Is there any economic feasibility for Iran in this plan for nuclear technology? Economically, the expectation of the people is very high. The regime has to address these expectations, and our energy relies on fissile material. This cost us a lot. We have to get rid of this. This is not the policy of the current regime; this is the continuation of the past regime. This is something that the Americans and Europeans advised before the Revolution -- there was a competition between Europe and the US to build these nuclear plants in Iran. Billions of dollars every year goes for importing gas, and the way we are managing our energy system now tells you that maybe in a few decades, we should import gas. So why should we go that way? Why not have our energy based on nuclear technology? This is the real question which everybody has to answer.
Before the Revolution, our population was only 30 million and European and American were advising us to have it. Now we have a population of 65 million and they say, don't have it because you are what you are. So economic feasibility is one reason Iranians are emphasizing.
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The second issue goes to the political psychology of Iranian people in general. As you know, Iran has had a long history with the British before the constitutional movement and, after that, always the agreements between British and Iran and other Europeans were one sided. Then you have a foreign coup, the 1953 coup, and a sense of humiliation that has pushed the Iranian people to believe deep in their heart in the principle of independence.
Looking back to the beginning of the Revolution, we had three slogans. The first was independence. The second was freedom. The third was peace in the ecosystem of Islamic republic. At that time some argued, what is the freedom? What is the level of freedom? What is the meaning of this political system that you are talking about? But nobody speaks about independence, none of the Iranians, except this group called People's Mujahideen who were a spy of Saddam Hussein and now they are a spy of the Pentagon. This is the first group in Muslim countries who began suicide killing after killing Americans in 1970s. This was done in 1980 before the Iran-Iraq War, just going to prayer, killing the clergymen, killing the people among them. So, if you want to know who began suicide killings, they are those people who are in the hands of the Pentagon now.
So, besides that group, everybody believes in Iranian independence. Everybody believes deep in their hearts about self-sufficiency, for that is very important when you cannot trust so many countries. They tell you, we will give you the fuel, and we know that they have not kept their promise yet, so why should we go for that? In the hearts and minds of the Iranian people, this is an issue of independence.
The next point is that the Iranians say, but what happens in Vienna in June? If the issue is oppression and pressure against the Iranian people and the Iranian regime, this means this is the beginning of so many pressures that we have to confront in the future, and we don't go for that. That is why they say, okay, we won’t come anymore. That is to say, okay, it is possible that we do not cooperate even with IAEA if this is just going to continue. So they don't go for the pressure. This is why Iran is behaving in such a way at this point.
One last point is also important. The denial of Iranian rights in so many fields, including technology, all this economic pressure, economic sanctions in the last 25 years, is a pattern. Therefore Iran thinks, if that pattern is there, what should I do? They keep saying, why did Iran go to third hand? Why did it hide it? Why this and that? If you have no other way, if you have been always sanctioned, if there is no rational behavior of a country such as the United States, then what should we do? That is why, when it goes to the technical issues, when you say, why is there no transparency? All of it is because of this pattern of denial of Iranian rights.
We are really scared. Scared because we are deprived of our rights to get everything that we want based on Article 4 of NPT. Every country has the right to get the technology, the know-how and all those things, and there is no justification needed to get these rights based on NPT. Why we are deprived of it? These technical difficulties take you nowhere; if you go deeply, you see they are discrepancies, they are lies. The real cause is that they want to deprive Iran of its rights, and that is what creates problems.
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Vision
The vision of the American Iranian Council is that the United States and Iran will work together, since their common interests far outweigh their differences. AIC also envisions the Iranian-American community playing an increasingly significant role in American society, and Iran becoming a democratically developed member of the global community with full respect for human rights.
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Mission
The mission of AIC is to be a constructive force, in cooperation and partnership with other organizations, in bringing the United States and Iran together, involving the Iranian-American community in the dialogue, and bringing attention to social and political conditions in Iran.
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Goals
The three interrelated goals of the American Iranian Council are:
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To serve as a platform for sustained dialogue on U.S.-Iran relations.
2. To serve as a catalyst to educate all Americans, including Iranian-Americans, regarding this dialogue.
3. To serve as a forum for discussion of issues of importance in Iranian society.
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